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The Aftermath of Copenhagen: Does
International Law have a Role to Play in a
Global Response to Climate Change?
JACOB WERKSMAN†& KIRK HERBERTSON‡
_______________________
I. INTRODUCTION
International negotiations on a global response to climate change
have, since they were launched in the early 1990s, faced two linked
challenges: (1) agreeing on a long-term strategy for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) that responds to the threat of
climate change and that reflects the common but differentiated
responsibilities of all major emitters of these gases; and (2) capturing
these responsibilities in the form of a legally binding instrument.
At the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in
Copenhagen,1 the international community moved a step closer to
responding to the first challenge. For the first time in the climate
change negotiations, all major emitters—including more than ninety
developed and developing countries—have come forward with
pledges that reflect what they are willing to do to reduce greenhouse
† Program Director of Institutions and Governance, World Resources Institute
and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and New York
University School of Law. This Article draws heavily from Jacob Werksman and
Kirk Herbertson, The Legal Character of National Actions and Commitments in a
Copenhagen Agreement: Options and Implications (World Resources Institute,
Working Paper) (updated in light of the results from COP-15), available at
http://www.wri.org.
‡ Associate, World Resources Institute.
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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gas emissions. These pledges have since been included in the
appendices of the ―Copenhagen Accord‖ as a two-page political
declaration that was ―noted‖ but not adopted at the end the of the
Conference.2 The Accord is not a legally binding agreement. Does it
matter?
Most governments, developed and developing, maintain that a
legally binding instrument is essential to the next stage in the design
of an international climate change regime.3 Hundreds of
nongovernmental environment and development organizations have
urged their governments to agree on and enter into a ―fair, ambitious
and binding‖ outcome.4 Why then, does consensus on the legal
2. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Fifteenth Sess., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen, Den., Draft
Decision -/CP 15: Proposal by the President, Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
3. See, for example, the post-Copenhagen position of the European
Commission, stating that ―[o]ur primary objective remains to reach a robust and
legally-binding agreement under the UNFCCC.‖ Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: International Climate Policy
post-Copenhagen: Acting now to Reinvigorate Global Action on Climate Change,
at 4, COM (2010) 86 final (Mar. 9, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/com_2010_86.pdf. See also the postCopenhagen submission of the United States on next steps for the climate change
negotiations, indicating that:
[t]he United States considers that it would be valuable to address the
intended legal character of the agreed outcome earlier rather than later. The
United States supports a legally binding outcome in Mexico provided that
the legally binding elements in an otherwise acceptable agreement would
apply in a symmetrical manner to all major economies.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol,
Eleventh Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., Apr. 9–11, 2010, and Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Ninth Sess., Bonn, F.R.G.,
Apr. 9–11, 2010, Views on the Need for Additional Meeting Time for the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto
Protocol and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under
the Convention, and on Organization of Work of the Ad Hoc working Group on
Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention: Submission From Parties—
United States of America, at 50, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/MISC.1, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.1 (Mar. 16, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Submission
to Ad Hoc Working Group], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awg
lca9/eng/misc01.pdf.
4. JULIE-ANNE RICHARDS, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L, FAIR, AMBITIOUS
& BINDING: ESSENTIALS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE DEAL 10 (2009),
http://www.climatenetwork.org/climate-change-basics/CAN_FAB_Essentials.pdf

WERKSMAN MACRO - 05-11-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

THE AFTERMATH OF COPENHAGEN

5/27/2010 3:53 PM

111

character of a climate agreement remain elusive? The analysis that
follows reveals two interconnected reasons.
Firstly, even as developing countries begin to embrace, on their
own terms, their part of a common responsibility for responding to
climate change, they insist that the legal character of that
responsibility remain differentiated from the responsibilities of
developed countries. This issue is of particular concern to the socalled ―major economy‖ developing countries, whose per capita
wealth remains relatively low, but whose national emissions have
grown to include a significant share of global totals. Developed
country counterparts have shown a willingness to accept a high
degree of differentiation between the level of effort required of richer
and poorer countries but insist that all major economies—developed
and developing—be part of an agreement of the same legal character.
From this perspective, international legal character seems to matter
very much.
Secondly, as more countries have come forward with pledges of
targets and actions in the absence of a new, legally binding
instrument, some governments have begun to signal that a ―soft law‖
approach to the climate negotiations may be sufficient. What really
matters is that the pledges reflect measurable, reportable, and
verifiable actions and that they are embedded in domestic law. From
this perspective, the international legal character of a future climate
agreement seems less important.
Because UNFCCC parties have failed to adopt rules of procedure
that would have allowed it to take decisions other than by consensus,
parties have had a particularly challenging time closing the gap
between countries on issues of the ambition and balance of
commitments, as well as on the legal nature of a climate agreement.
Indeed, in the absence of rules that would allow majority voting, even
a substantial majority of parties must overcome the formal objections
of a few before any decisions could be taken, including those that
could lead to legally binding instruments.
This Article briefly describes the shifting expectations of the role
of international legal character in the development of a climate
change agreement. It highlights the perspective of developing country
major economies (in particular Brazil, South Africa, China, and
(emphasis added).
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India—the BASIC countries) which are under growing pressure to
undertake legally binding commitments to reduce their emissions. It
then provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the elements of
legal character in other multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) and reviews the history of how previous climate change
agreements reflect these elements. Finally, it seeks to analyze the
costs and benefits of entering into a legally binding agreement and
what this might mean for major economies as well as for the future
development of the climate change regime. It concludes that there are
at least two possible ways to manage the tension between ambitious,
broadly applicable commitments and a legally binding instrument.
The first option would be to pursue arrangements of a nonbinding
nature, under which countries ―pledge and review‖ policies
developed at the national level and rely on politics rather than law to
underpin the regime at the international level. The second option is to
continue to use the UNFCCC, a legally binding treaty, as the
backbone for future commitments but to invest deeply in UNFCCC
procedures and institutions to review and promote compliance with
commitments of a ―soft law‖ nature.
II. SHIFTING EXPECTATIONS OF THE ROLE
CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT

OF

LAW

IN A

GLOBAL

Since 1990, when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) first
recognized the need for an international response to the threat of
climate change, it has been assumed that a legally binding treaty
would be key to that response.5 UNGA set in train a process that led
to the 1992 UNFCCC, a legally binding treaty containing minimal
commitments reflecting the ―common but differentiated
responsibilities and capabilities‖6 in the context of climate change by
dividing the world into Annex I (developed) and non-Annex
(developing) countries. In many ways the UNFCCC set an
expectation that the climate regime will move forward in a legally
binding form as long as the commitments it contains are highly
differentiated between developed and developing countries.
Following a review of the scientific adequacy of the UNFCCC’s
5. See Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of
Mankind, G.A. Res. 45/212, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/212 (Dec. 21, 1990)
(calling for the ―negotiations for the preparation of an effective framework
convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any
related legal instruments as might be agreed upon,‖ which led to the UNFCCC).
6. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
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commitments, its parties launched a new round of negotiations in
1995 aimed at strengthening the regime. In 1997, UNFCCC parties
concluded the Kyoto Protocol (KP),7 a legally binding treaty which
sets binding emissions targets and timetables for developed countries.
However, like the Convention, the Protocol contains no requirement
that developing countries cut emissions. For these and other reasons
the U.S., the largest historical emitter of GHGs, refused to ratify the
Protocol and thus seriously undermined its effectiveness. Under
growing pressure to develop a new arrangement that could either
extend, amend, or replace the Kyoto Protocol, in 2007, the UNFCCC
parties, including the United States, agreed in the Bali Action Plan on
a roadmap for a post-2012 climate agreement.8
The Bali Action Plan was negotiated against the backdrop of U.S.
inaction, potential widespread noncompliance with the Kyoto
Protocol by other developed countries, and growing emissions from
major emerging countries. It called for enhanced national and
international action on mitigation of climate change, including
commitments by developed countries and, significantly, ―nationally
appropriate mitigation actions‖ (NAMAs) by developing countries. It
called upon parties to conclude their negotiations with an agreed
outcome by COP-15 but did not indicate whether that outcome would
be in the form of a legally binding instrument.
In the lead up to the Copenhagen COP, an informal group of
seventeen of the world’s largest emitters of GHGs9 launched the
―Major Economies Forum‖ (MEF).10 In July 2009, MEF leaders
signaled an apparently radical departure from previous climate
agreements. They (1) recognized that, in order to prevent the global
7. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol].
8. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Thirteenth Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Decision
1/CP.13, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008)
[hereinafter Bali Action Plan], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/co
p13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3.
9. These include: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia,
South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.
10. Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, Declaration of the
Leaders: The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (July 9, 2009),
http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/past-meetings/the-first-leaders-meeting.html
[hereinafter MEF Declaration].
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mean temperature from rising more than two degrees Celsius above
pre-industrial levels, global emissions must drop substantially by
2050;11 and (2) declared that they will ―undertake transparent
nationally appropriate mitigation actions, subject to applicable
measurement, reporting, and verification, and prepare low-carbon
growth plans.‖12 Developing major economies also, for the first time,
pledged to ―promptly undertake actions whose projected effects on
emissions represent a meaningful deviation from business as usual in
the midterm . . . .‖13
The MEF Declaration raised expectations that a Copenhagen
agreement could demonstrate how all major economies will take
actions to reduce global emissions by more than fifty percent by 2020
and by more than eighty percent by 2050. If so, for the first time,
both developed and developing countries would need to design,
declare, and be held accountable for either NAMAs or commitments
that put humanity on track towards a low-carbon future. However, as
Copenhagen approached, the MEF statements also began to reveal
emerging views on legal form and review procedures that would
represent a significant retreat from a UNFCCC process that had been
premised on the importance of a legally binding instrument. By the
time they met in London in October 2009, MEF leaders had begun to
describe their goal as merely to ―internationalize‖ domestic climate
policies in the form of ―listings‖ subject only to a party-led peerreview process.14 As COP-15 approached, both the UN Secretary
General and the Danish government, which would play host for and
preside over the Copenhagen COP, picked up on the MEF signals and
began to lower expectations as to the legal character of any COP-15
outcome.15
Over a hundred heads of state and government arrived in the last
days of COP-15 to discover their delegations deadlocked. The
11. Id. para. 1
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. The Fifth Leaders’ Representative Meeting, Major Economies Forum on
Energy and Climate Changes, London, U.K., Oct. 18–19, 2009, Chair’s Summary:
Fifth Meeting of the Leaders’ Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on
Energy and Climate, available at http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/pastmeetings/the-fifth-leaders-representatives-meeting.html.
15. Louis Charbonneau, U.N. Lowers Expectations for Copenhagen Climate
Deal, REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE59P4YY20
091026.
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Copenhagen Accord16 was hammered out in the last hours among five
governments that are key to the future of the climate regime (the U.S.
and the BASIC countries) and with a shared reluctance to make
specific commitments.17 When the Accord was brought back to the
conference as a whole, those that felt excluded from the process and
disappointed with the results blocked the consensus necessary (in the
absence of majority voting rules) to adopt the Accord as a COP
decision. Thus, at the end of COP-15, the Accord was given no
official status as a UNFCCC document. It was merely taken note of.18
Setting aside issues of its legal status, the Accord contains
substance of some significance. It can be read to commit the
countries that agree to it to acting collectively to dramatically reduce
their emissions in such a way that will limit global warming to no
more than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels—an
achievement that many scientists believe is essential to avoid the
most dangerous impacts of global warming. In keeping with the
UNFCCC’s and KP’s principles of differentiation, it calls upon
developed countries to ―commit to implement individually or jointly
the quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020‖ and to
submit these for inclusion in Appendix I of the Accord.19 It calls upon
developing countries to ―implement mitigation actions‖ and to submit
these for inclusion in Appendix II.20 It also contains pledges by
developed countries to provide up to $30 billion in finance to reduce
emissions and build resilience to climate impacts in developing
countries in the near term and $100 billion a year by 2020.21
The Accord and its appendices of targets and actions differentiate
between developed and developing countries—although the gap has
closed dramatically. They are not, however, legally binding. 22 Indeed,
16. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2.
17. Arthur Max, UN Climate Envoy Expects Dual-Track Negotiations,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/
ALeqM5jgEChLfSlnFM9sVxr1mcG_iYxHvgD9EFPGC00.
18. Id.
19. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
20. Id. para. 5 (emphasis added).
21. Id. para. 8.
22. In a series of notes to the parties following the adoption of the Accord, the
UNFCCC Secretariat addressed questions raised about the legal character of the
accord by clarifying that,
since the Conference of the Parties neither adopted nor endorsed the Accord,
but merely took note of it, its provisions do not have any legal standing
within the UNFCCC process even if some Parties decide to associate
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a sentence in an early draft that would have called on parties to
convert these pledges into legal text at the next COP was removed
because of China’s refusal to contemplate legally binding
commitments and the U.S. refusal to be bound without China.23 But
the Accord is politically binding on those countries that choose to
support it, and dozens of delegations publicly expressed their
approval of it during the final COP plenary session. Politically
binding—if it means anything—means that political consequences
will flow from its breach. These could include, for example,
diplomatic responses, efforts at public shaming, or the withholding of
discretionary funding. In this sense, the Accord can be considered a
strong, high-level commitment by the countries that have adhered to
it.
The Accord also describes itself as ―operational immediately.‖24
This language was included in the Accord by parties that had hoped it
would be adopted as a COP decision in Copenhagen. Because it was
not, those parts of the Accord that would require a COP decision
cannot be operationalized.25
The chaos of the final COP plenary session and the confused state
of the Accord’s text left many doubts as to how many and which
countries would, in the end, support the Accord. The Accord set a
deadline of 31 January 2010 for countries to submit targets and
actions to be included in the Accord’s appendices.26 When the
Accord’s deadline passed, 95 of the UN Framework Convention’s
192 Parties had responded. Of these, thirty-eight developed countries
and twenty-seven developing countries lodged their targets and

themselves with it. . . . [T]he accord is a political agreement rather than a
treaty instrument . . . .
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Executive Secretary,
Bonn, F.R.G., Jan. 25, 2010, Notification to Parties: Clarification Relating to the
Notification of 18 January 2010, available at http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and
_observers/notifications/application/pdf/100125_noti_clarification.pdf.
23. See generally TREVOR HOUSER, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., POLICY
BRIEF: COPENHAGEN, THE ACCORD AND THE WAY FORWARD 6–7 (2010),
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-05.pdf.
24. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, pmbl.
25. For example, the Accord purports to decide to establish a ―Copenhagen
Green Climate Fund‖ as an operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial
mechanism; this can only be done by a COP decision. Id. para. 10.
26. Id. para. 4.
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actions with the United Nations.27
The UNFCCC Secretariat, with support from the Danish COP
Presidency and the UN Secretary General, also invited each party to
the UNFCCC to send it an official communication indicating whether
it wished to ―associate itself with the Accord and that its name should
be included in the chapeau of the Accord.‖28 Some influential
commentators who objected to the Accord’s content and the process
of its adoption sought to discourage countries—particularly
developing countries—from formally associating themselves with the
Accord on the grounds that this might imbue the document with a
legally binding character.29
Some of the BASIC countries, particularly India and China, were
demonstrably reluctant to respond to the Secretariat’s request. Even
after having submitted their actions for inclusion in Appendix II, both
countries did so without reference to the Accord, preferring instead to
make reference to provisions in the UNFCCC which encourage
countries to report on their policies and measures.30 Since then,
following further requests for clarification from the Secretariat, both
27. See U.S. Climate Action Network, Who’s on Board with the Copenhagen
Accord, http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments
(last visited Apr. 9, 2010). These pledges fall well short of the deep cuts in
emissions that will be necessary to keep global temperatures at safe levels. Kelly
Kevin & Rob Bradley, Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges 2
(World
Resource
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
2010),
available
at
http://pdf.wri.org/working_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_p
ledges_2010-02-01.pdf.
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Executive
Secretary, Bonn, F.R.G., Jan. 18, 2010, Notification to Parties: Communication of
Information Relating to the Copenhagen Accord, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
parties_and_observers/notifications/application/pdf/notification_to_parties_201001
18.pdf. The chapeau of the Accord contains a set of square brackets around the
words ―List of Parties‖ which the Secretariat has since been seeking to fill,
retroactively, with the permission of each UNFCCC party.
29. ―[A]ssociation with the Copenhagen Accord in writing, as requested by the
Danish Presidency, would essentially be a unilateral declaration on the part of the
associating Party of its willingness to be bound – in both political and international
law terms – to the provisions of the Copenhagen Accord.‖ SOUTH CENTRE,
COMMENTS ON THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD: SUMMARY, Jan. 18, 2010,
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=121
6%3Acomments-on-the-copenhagen-accord&catid=129%3Aclimate-change-&It
emid=67&lang=en.
30. Letter from SU Wei, Director General, Department of Climate Change,
National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Yvo de Boer,
Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat (Jan. 28, 2010), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/chinacphaccord_app2.pdf.
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China and India have agreed to have their names included in the
Accord’s chapeau.31 However, neither country has chosen to state that
it is ―associating‖ with the Accord.
While these most recent responses to the Accord are promising,
developing country major economies have treated the issue of its
legal character skittishly, from their refusal to adopt it as a COP
decision to their reluctance to ―associate‖ with it. Understanding this
reluctance and its implications for the future development of the
climate regime requires a deeper analysis of the meaning of legal
character for these countries.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF LEGAL CHARACTER FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRY MAJOR ECONOMIES
In this uncertain context, this Article seeks to draw conclusions
about the relevance of legal character for developing country major
economies (see Box 1). It is likely that an agreement subsequent to
Copenhagen will continue to maintain a ―development divide‖ that
reflects significant distinctions in the commitments of developed and
developing countries. It is also possible, however, that an agreed
outcome will, as the Copenhagen Accord begins to do, significantly
blur the previously bright lines that have distinguished the obligations
of these two groups of countries. There will be considerable pressure
on developing country major economies in general, and on the larger
emitters among them in particular, to take on actions that are more
closely comparable in their legal character to the commitments of
industrialized countries. This pressure will build through a
combination of international negotiations, bilateral diplomacy, and
unilateral domestic policies aimed at addressing ―competitiveness
concerns‖ between those countries that are undertaking caps and
those that are not. Industrialized countries will continue to push hard
under the UNFCCC and through multiple other forums—such as the
MEF and the G-20—to secure what they view as ―comparable‖
commitments from major economies that are non-Annex I Parties to
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including with regard to the
legal form of those commitments. In its first formal submission postCopenhagen, the U.S. has, for example, stated that it ―supports a
31. See, e.g., Letter from SU Wei, Director General, Department of Climate
Change, National Development and Reform Commission of China, to Yvo de Boer,
Executive Secretary, UNFCCC Secretariat (Mar. 9, 2010), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/indiacphaccord.pdf.
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legally binding outcome in Mexico provided that the legally binding
elements in an otherwise acceptable agreement would apply in a
symmetrical manner to all major economies.‖32

Box 1: CO2 Emissions and Development in the Major Economies Forum

CO2
Emissions
Per Capita

Total CO2
Emissions

UNDP
Human
Development Index

GDP Per
Capita

2004

2004

2006

2006

(2006
ranking)

(PPP US$)

(Metric tons (1,000,000
/ person)
metric tons)

United
19.84
5,889
15
43,968
Statesabc
Australiaabc
17.48
351
4
33,035
abc
Canada
17.18
549
3
36,687
Russiaac
10.89
1,575
73
13,205
Rep. of
10.63
507
25
22,985
Koreabc
Germanyabc
10.37
857
23
31,766
abc
Japan
10.21
1,304
8
31,951
United
9.19
551
21
32,654
Kingdomabc
South Africac 9.00
428
125
9,087
Italyabc
8.25
482
19
28,828
abc
France
6.54
397
11
31,980
Chinac
4.23
5,205
94
4,682
bc
Mexico
4.02
415
51
12,176
Brazilc
1.88
346
70
8,949
Indonesiac
1.65
368
109
3,455
c
India
1.07
1,199
132
2,489
a
Annex I; bOECD; cG20
Sources: WRI Earthtrends; UNDP Human Development Report 2008.

32. U.S. Submission to Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 3, at 50.
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The actions to which a developing country major economy may
agree will be based on what it can afford, politically and
economically, to undertake domestically and vis-a-vis its economic
competitors. Where does a country wish to position itself
geopolitically, now and in the coming decades, in relation to its peers
on either side of the ―development divide‖? There is a great deal of
unclaimed space for leadership in the climate change negotiations.
Supporting high standards with regard to the legal form, content, and
institutional and procedural oversight of all parties’ undertakings
would be consistent with leadership. Such leadership would signal
support for multilateralism and the rule of law and could generate
significant goodwill from the international community. Given the soft
consequences that typically flow from the breach of an MEA and the
growing appetite of some developed countries for unilateral trade and
investment measures to address ―competitiveness concerns,‖33 the
rewards of undertaking a binding commitment may prove higher than
the risks.
Ultimately, the position a country takes on the legal character of an
international agreement it intends to join involves a calculation about
the redistribution of sovereignty. Is it willing to consent to a
constraint on its own sovereignty in exchange for a reciprocal
constraint on the sovereignty of other parties? Does the problem that
the international agreement intends to solve depend upon these
constraints? These are questions each party needs to assess in the
context of a highly dynamic process.
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL CHARACTER
In general, the legal character of an international agreement is
reflected in its form, its content, and the institutions and procedures
established to promote compliance with, and enforcement of, its
terms. A legally binding treaty containing specific and enforceable
obligations is the highest form of expression of political commitment
and will at the international level. Ratifying such a treaty signals a
party’s serious intent to comply with the treaty’s terms and, in return,
can generate reciprocity and good will—elements essential to
improve ratification of and compliance with a treaty. However, even
if the negotiations lead eventually to a legally binding agreement, it
may not result in legally binding commitments for all parties and will
33. See infra Part VII.
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likely contain commitments of a highly differentiated content (see
Box 2).
One potential outcome of the ongoing negotiations is a legally
binding agreement that would be open for ratification by all parties.
However, not all ―legally binding‖ agreements contain clear and
enforceable commitments.
In practice, states regularly enter into agreements that take a
legally binding form but are softly worded, vague, and in some
circumstances unenforceable. For example, under proposals
submitted by UNFCCC parties prior to Copenhagen, a legally
binding instrument could, (1) for some or all parties, contain
discretionary ―pledges‖ of actions that are not expressed in legally
binding language; (2) for some or all parties, provide for no
mechanisms to review or enforce compliance; (3) for developing
country parties, make the performance of their NAMAs contingent on
developed countries meeting their obligations to provide financial
support; and/or (4) limit some or all parties’ commitments to
performance ―in conformity with domestic law‖ and allow those
parties to change domestic law without incurring international legal
consequences.34
A. Understanding the Legal Character of a Multilateral
Environmental Agreement
Major, contemporary MEAs35 are most commonly expressed in
legally binding treaty form as ―conventions‖ and ―protocols‖ to those
conventions.36 Typically, these MEAs incorporate the formal legal
elements of treaties, most notably final clauses that include
provisions for signature, ratification, accession, approval, and
withdrawal recognized by international treaty law and customary law
as a means of expressing and withdrawing consent to be bound.37
34. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, Sixth
Sess., Bonn, F.R.G., June 1–12, 2009, Revised Negotiating Text: Note by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1 (June 22, 2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/inf01.pdf.
35. We use the term MEA in this Article to refer to legally binding treaties, not
―soft law‖ instruments such as ministerial declarations.
36. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79.
37. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 11, 54, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLOT].
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In terms of their content, many MEAs, including the UNFCCC and
the KP, contain highly differentiated commitments that vary widely
with regard to their legal form, clarity, specificity, and ambition.
Commitments within MEAs can be expressed in either mandatory or
discretionary language. They can be understood as obligations of
conduct, which include obligations to cooperate, prepare programs,
report on progress, or promote public awareness of issues; and
obligations of result, which require parties to achieve measurable,
reportable, and verifiable results, for example, through specific
targets and timetables. Thus, many contemporary MEAs contain
differentiated commitments, which allow parties to the same binding
treaty to have commitments that differ in their legal form as well as
their clarity, specificity, and ambition.
In some cases, even though commitments in a treaty are legally
binding in their form (e.g., they are described as commitments, use
mandatory language, and are contained in a legally binding treaty),
they may have very little legal effect at the international level. If the
language in which they are expressed is vague and imprecise,
assessing compliance becomes difficult. In these cases, binding text
may in effect be unenforceable at the international level.
Nevertheless, for many countries, the international legal character of
an MEA will trigger domestic ratification procedures, rooting the
agreement in domestic legal and political process and, in some
circumstances, triggering the enactment of enabling legislation. The
domestic legal effect of an international treaty can be more
significant than what is reflected in the international instrument.
The accountability of a party under an MEA depends on the
institutions and procedures the agreement establishes to promote
implementation by monitoring, reviewing, and promoting compliance
with their commitments. Many contemporary MEAs require parties
to report on their progress and establish a process to review these
reports. Some contemporary MEAs have established multilateral
procedures and institutions that promote compliance with their terms
by offering financial and technical assistance. This assistance is
typically limited to eligible developing country parties or parties with
―economies in transition‖ (EITs) to market economies.
A few of these compliance procedures are authorized to reach
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conclusions as to whether a party is in noncompliance and
recommend the suspension of rights and privileges under the MEAs.38
Some MEAs also require, authorize, or provide a basis for justifying
the use of unilateral trade measures by one party against another
party for failure to comply with their terms.
Many contemporary MEAs, including the UNFCCC and the KP,
provide for ―latent‖ binding arbitration, judicial dispute settlement, or
compulsory but nonbinding conciliation as the means of settling
disputes that arise between parties. Many MEAs, like the UNFCCC
and the KP, provide for ―optional clauses‖ that allow parties to opt
into compulsory and binding judicial dispute settlement. However, no
contemporary MEA has required parties, when ratifying the
agreement, to subject themselves to a compulsory and binding
judicial dispute-settlement procedure, and no party to a contemporary
MEA has done so.39
B. What If a Country Breaches a Legally Binding Multilateral
Environmental Agreement?
Although it remains rare for an MEA to provide for compulsory
and binding enforcement procedures and define specific remedies and
consequences for breach, it remains an important principle of
international law—perhaps the most important principle—that breach
of an international treaty gives rise to state responsibility for the
consequences of that breach.
All internationally binding agreements are governed by the
principle of ―pacta sunt servanda‖ meaning that ―[e]very treaty in
force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith.‖40 Essentially, this is a statement of the ―rule of law‖ in
international relations. Customary international law is emerging to
suggest that the breach of an international obligation, including an
international treaty obligation, is an internationally wrongful act that
38. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME, HANDBOOK FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER: THE
VIENNA CONVENTION (1985), THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (1987) 296 (6th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter Ozone Handbook], available at http://www.unep.org/Ozone/pdfs/Ha
ndbook-2003.pdf.
39. The exception, if it is to be considered an MEA, is the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea, which provides for compulsory and binding judicial dispute
settlement. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 286, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261.
40. VCLOT, supra note 37, art. 26.
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gives rise to state responsibility to make restitution for the
consequences of that breach.41 Parties to an MEA may agree in
advance what specific consequences will flow from the breach of a
particular provision of a treaty. As will be mentioned, the KP’s
―enforcement consequences‖ as well as the trade bans in other
MEAs, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,42 are rare but important examples of
such pre-defined enforcement consequences.43
C. What Is the Value of a Legally Binding Multilateral
Environmental Agreement Without Strong Enforcement
Procedures?
In the absence of strong enforcement procedures and
consequences, MEAs can promote accountability by establishing
institutions and procedures with the authority to receive, analyze, and
report information on parties’ activities. A data-rich environment
enables parties to build trust through verification and exercise the
kind of diplomatic pressure—sometimes referred to as ―shaming‖—
that is an essential means of promoting accountability among
countries.
Contemporary MEAs continue to rely heavily on transparency of
information and multilateral diplomatic processes for accountability.
For eligible parties, they also rely on technical and financial
assistance, rather than legal formalism, to promote compliance with
their terms. The formalities associated with a legally binding regime
can, however, operate to exclude parties, including parties crucial to
the MEA’s effectiveness, from participating in the regime. Domestic
ratification processes can slow or prevent a country from formally
joining a regime.
The binding character of an MEA under international law is
properly understood as an expression of the highest level of political
will of the parties to achieve its objectives. While legally binding
41. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
at 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
42. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
43. Chatham House, Sustainable Development Programme, The CITES Treaty
and Compliance: Progress or Jeopardy? 4 BP 04/01 (Sept. 2004) (prepared by
Rosalind Reeve), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9267_bp09
04cites.pdf.
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form need not include legally binding content for all parties, it does
tend to generate the more sophisticated and robust institutions and
procedures necessary to support transparency and accountability of
performance. The legally binding nature of an agreement correlates,
for example, with the budgets and political clout of the institutions
associated with these regimes, including their ability to attract
financial support, the attention of high level representation, media
attention, and the support of civil society and the public at large.
V. A BRIEF HISTORY
CHANGE REGIME

OF

LEGAL CHARACTER UNDER

THE

CLIMATE

A. The UNFCCC
The UNFCCC and KP have in many ways followed the form,
content, and procedural and institutional characteristics of the ozonelayer-protection regime, widely regarded as among the most
successful MEAs.44 The 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer45 and the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer46 forged a legally binding set of
schedules for the phase out of the consumption and production of
chemicals that threaten the stratospheric shield that protects life on
earth from ultraviolet radiation. In two decades, its legal framework
of commitments, financial and technical support, and compliance
system led developed and developing countries to dispose of
stockpiles, transform industrial processes, and dramatically reverse
the deterioration of the ozone layer.
Like the Vienna Ozone Convention, the UNFCCC is a
―framework‖ treaty. It is legally binding in its form and relatively
weak in its content but provides for quite robust procedures and
institutions, including the means to enhance its commitments through
44. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 345–46 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the Montreal Protocol as ―a landmark
international environmental agreement, providing a precedent for new regulatory
techniques and institutional arrangements‖); PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 522–23 (2d ed. 2002) (noting that
―the Ozone Convention and the Montreal Protocol have provided one of the most
sophisticated and effective models of international regulation and supervision for
environmental purposes‖).
45. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Vienna Ozone Convention].
46. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sep. 16
1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal
Protocol].
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the adoption of protocols. As a ratifiable international agreement, the
Convention provides a legally binding framework that sets out an
overall objective, a set of principles, a series of procedural
obligations, and a set of institutions designed to oversee the
implementation and development of the regime. Those commitments
that are applicable to all parties are general obligations of conduct,
including the commitment to develop national climate programs and
national emissions inventories and report these to the COP.
The UNFCCC also contains a softly worded ―aim‖ which suggests
that developed (Annex I) parties should return their GHG emissions
to 1990 levels by 2000. It establishes a financial mechanism to
support the incremental costs of developing country implementation
of their commitments. Annex I parties that were also members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in 1992 (Annex II parties) are required to provide an unspecified
amount of ―new and additional‖ financial resources to the
UNFCCC’s financial mechanism.
All parties are required to develop national inventories of GHGs
and to formulate and implement national programs containing
measures to mitigate emissions and facilitate adaptation to climate
change. This information is to be communicated to the COP, which is
mandated to:
[a]ssess, on the basis of all information made available to it in
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, the
implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall
effects of the measures taken pursuant to the Convention, in
particular environmental, economic and social effects as well
as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress
towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved.47
The commitments of non-Annex I parties under the UNFCCC and
the KP are, in the view of some parties, contingent upon the
fulfillment of Annex II parties of their obligation to provide new and
additional funding to support developing country implementation.48
47. UNFCCC, supra note 1, art. 7.2(e).
48. Id. art. 4.7 (providing that ―[t]he extent to which developing country Parties
will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on
the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments
under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and
will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty
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Arguably, this contingency affects the legally binding character of
developing country commitments by tying it to the performance of
other parties in providing finance.
The national communications and national GHG inventories of
Annex I parties have become subject to an expert review process
under the UNFCCC, which, at least in theory, provides an
opportunity for the COP or its Subsidiary Body for Implementation to
assess the implementation of individual Annex I parties.49 The COP’s
failure to ever assess a country’s implementation arguably
undermines an aspect of the legally binding character of parties’
commitments by signaling that parties are reluctant to hold each other
to account for noncompliance.
The UNFCCC has a set of final clauses that include standard
language on dispute settlement including articles on judicial dispute
settlement and arbitration. Those parties that agree, either in general
or when a specific dispute arises, to subject themselves to these
procedures, the dispute will be resolved with a legally binding
judgment. The UNFCCC also provides for a conciliation process,
which has compulsory jurisdiction over all parties but will operate
only when triggered by one party against another and can only
―render a recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in
good faith.‖50 None of these procedures has been invoked.
The UNFCCC parties negotiated and nearly completed the design
of a Multilateral Consultative Process (MCP), based largely on the
Montreal Protocol’s noncompliance system, which would have
facilitated compliance with the UNFCCC. The MCP was never
finalized, as the negotiations of the KP were seen to overtake the
need for a compliance system under the UNFCCC.51
B. The Kyoto Protocol
The KP develops the climate regime further through the
introduction of quantified emissions limitations and reduction
objectives (QELROs) for Annex I parties, which are specific, timebound ―obligations of result.‖ Each Annex I party is provided an
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country
Parties‖).
49. Id. art. 10.2(b).
50. Id. art. 14.6.
51. Id. art. 13.
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―assigned amount‖ of GHG emissions it is allowed during the KP’s
commitment period of 2008 to 2012. The KP’s ―flexibility‖
mechanisms are designed to reduce the costs to developed countries
of remaining within their assigned amounts by allowing them to trade
allowances among themselves and acquire offsets through
investments in GHG-reduction projects in developing countries. The
KP enhances the UNFCCC’s procedures and institutions for
reviewing the performance of Annex I parties and establishes a
compliance procedure designed both to facilitate and to enforce
compliance with its terms. Like the UNFCCC, the KP has a dispute
settlement procedure that would become operational only if parties
choose to opt into it.
The delegations that led the design of the Kyoto Protocol followed
the principle that more specific commitments and functioning
flexibility mechanisms required a more robust compliance system to
ensure accountability among parties and predictability for investors.
More particularly, they argued that an international emissions trading
system should be backed by a compliance system with an
enforcement mechanism. This logic led the negotiators to enhance
accountability by improving the procedures for carrying out expert
review of developed country inventories and national
communications. Expert Review Teams, operating under the auspices
of the UNFCCC Secretariat, are authorized to carry out in-depth
reviews of the quality of reported data and can raise questions of
implementation with regard to a party’s performance.
The logic behind legally binding commitments also led to a
mandate, under Article 18 of the KP, to:
approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms
to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the
provisions of this Protocol, including through the development
of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the
cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any
procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an
amendment to this Protocol.52
This mandate proved to be both an engine of innovation and a

52. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art. 18.
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brake on the legal integrity of the KP. The Marrakesh Accords 53 to
the KP put in place a Compliance System that is authorized to review
questions of implementation raised (either by the Expert Review
Teams or by a party) with regard to the performance of both
developing and developed parties. A question raised by or with
regard to a developing country party is referred to the ―Facilitative
Branch‖ of the KP’s Compliance Committee, which can provide
advice and assistance to that party.
A question of implementation raised with regard to a developed
country’s compliance with its obligation to report and comply with its
QELROs can, if substantiated, be referred to the Compliance
Committee’s ―Enforcement Branch.‖ If, during the KP’s commitment
period, the Enforcement Branch finds that a party is not in
compliance with its obligation to report on its national GHG
emissions, the Enforcement Branch can suspend that party’s
eligibility to engage in the KP’s market mechanisms. If, at the end of
the KP’s commitment period, a party, having been given a chance to
purchase additional offsets or allowances, still exceeds its assigned
amount, the Enforcement Branch can require that party to deduct 1.3
tonnes of carbon equivalent emissions from the subsequent
commitment period for each tonne that exceeds its assigned amount.
The KP’s compliance system was adopted as part of the Marrakesh
Accords in 2001 as a set of decisions taken by the UNFCCC COP in
preparation for the entry into force of the KP, following which both
branches of the Compliance Committee have begun operations.
Indeed, the Enforcement Branch has dealt with two cases of potential
noncompliance—both of which resulted in the improved performance
of the parties in question.54
However, the enforcement consequences associated with the
53. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Seventh Sess., Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29–Nov. 10, 2001,
Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, held at Marrakesh
from 29 October to 10 November 2009—Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Accords], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop
7/13a02.pdf.
54. See René Lefeber, The Practice of the Compliance Committee Under the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(2006–2007), in NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 303 (Tullio
Treves et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Non-Compliance Procedures 2009].
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findings of noncompliance—the suspension of the eligibility to
participate in the Kyoto Protocol’s ―flexibility mechanisms‖ and the
imposition of the thirty percent penalty—were never ―adopted by
means of amendment‖ to the Kyoto Protocol, as required by Article
18. Furthermore, the KP parties have yet to agree on their Assigned
Amounts for the second commitment period. This leaves open the
real possibility that, if a party were found by the Enforcement Branch
not to be in compliance at the end of the KP’s commitment period,
the enforcement penalties would be nonoperational.
C. Lessons for a Climate Change Agreement
Legally binding form, specific content, and robust institutions and
procedures were justified under the Kyoto Protocol by arguments that
linked the rule of law to environmental integrity, mutual
accountability, and the carbon market’s need for stability and
predictability. By linking the legal form of parties’ commitments to
specificity of content and robustness of institutions and process, the
KP climate change regime has introduced significant innovations to
international environmental law.55
There are several noteworthy successes. First, transparency and
accountability have been improved through the monitoring and
evaluation of developed country parties’ performance by Expert
Review Teams authorized to conduct in-country visits, deploy thirdparty data, and raise questions of implementation. Second, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibility has been
implemented through the split functions and jurisdictions of the
facilitative and enforcement branches in a way that gained the
acceptance by both developed and developing countries of enhanced
oversight of their performance. Third, while it is operating on
somewhat unstable legal grounds due to the language in Article 18,
the KP’s Compliance System is developing an important track record
in promoting compliance.
This suggests that a climate change agreement designed as an
55. Jacob Werksman, The Negotiations of a Kyoto Compliance System, in
IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 17–37 (Olav
Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2005); Geir Ulfstein & Jacob
Werksman, The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard Enforcement, in
IMPLEMENTING THE CLIMATE REGIME: INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE 39–62 (Olav
Schram Stokke, Jon Hovi & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2005).
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advance on the KP should maintain a logical link between form,
content, and procedures but should also seek to reach agreement on
the consequences for noncompliance within the ratifiable instrument
that contains the new commitments.
Market mechanisms are creatively used under the KP to both
reduce the costs of compliance and—through the threat of suspension
of the ability to trade—create incentives for compliance. International
emissions trading between Annex I countries depends upon the
legally binding character of their QELROs to create assigned amount
units that would be fungible across different domestic legal systems.
Offset trading based on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
depends on project-level contracts, enforceable through a mixture of
domestic legal systems, international arbitration, and, indirectly,
decisions made by the CDM Executive Board. The legal and
institutional character of the CDM arrangements have been essential
to providing credibility and predictability to buyers and sellers, as
well as environmental integrity to the system as a whole. If a climate
change agreement also relies on carbon markets, whether at the
allowance, project, or sectoral level, similar kinds of arrangements
will be necessary. Indeed, the emissions reduction purchase
agreements (ERPAs) and the CDM Executive Board’s mandate to
approve project baselines and certify emissions reductions, by
providing a legal and institutional framework for project-level
performance of developing countries, may provide a prototype for the
kind of results-based, measurable, reportable, and verifiable (MRV)
manner anticipated under the climate change negotiations.56
As discussed later, it is not clear that the Bali Action Plan and the
subsequent negotiations are taking a path similar to the KP with
regard to the legal character of a post-2012 agreement and its
multilaterally agreed approach to carbon markets. As was described
above, some developed countries have rejected what they see as the
KP’s heavily ―top-down‖ approach. Others that championed the need
for strong rules and institutions during the KP negotiations have been
disappointed by the performance of parties and the institutions
created under the KP. Efforts by developed countries to include more
specific commitments by major developing economies in a climate
56. See DAVID FREESTONE & CHARLOTTE STRECK, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 295–
377 (2005).
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change agreement have also dampened the enthusiasm of developing
countries for a legally binding regime with a tough compliance
mechanism. Some have begun to emphasize the need for a greater
focus on the legal character of domestic rules and the capacity of
national institutions as the main engines of implementing and
enforcing climate change policy.
VI. BALI, COPENHAGEN, AND THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF A FUTURE
CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT
In the absence of a COP decision in Copenhagen, the COP’s
decisions in Bali, as informed by the Copenhagen Accord, will guide
the climate change negotiations going forward. Together, they leave
unsettled the legal form, content, and institutional and procedural
dimensions of a future climate change agreement. However, they do
contain two major breakthroughs that could have implications for the
legal character of the post-2012 regime and that have been reflected
and developed further in the Copenhagen Accord. First, the Bali
Action Plan (BAP) set the expectation that all parties to a climate
change agreement, developed and developing, will demonstrate how
they are contributing to the UNFCCC’s objective. This expectation
has now been at least partially fulfilled by the pledges of developed
country targets and developing country actions in the Accord’s
appendices. Second, the Bali Action Plan and the Accord have
confirmed the expectation that all parties describe the content of their
commitments and actions in an MRV manner.
A. Legal Form
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol provide for four types of
―related legal instruments‖—protocols, amendments, annexes, and
amendments to annexes. Each of these would be legally binding on
the parties that ratified the respective instrument. As has been
described, many parties continue to aspire for the negotiations to lead
to a new treaty, an amendment of the UNFCCC or KP, or both.
The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties
to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) also has the ability to reach decisions
and, in the past, has provided fora for the adoption of ―Ministerial
Declarations.‖ While mainstream interpretations of international law
do not view such decisions of COPs as legally binding on parties,
they have had important political and legal effects on parties’
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commitments.57
The Marrakesh Accords to the Kyoto Protocol, for example,
contain authoritative interpretations, clarifications, and elaborations
of the KP’s text. Most significantly, the CMP’s interpretations of the
appropriate method for calculating emissions from Land Use, Land
Use Change, and Forestry had specific and direct consequences for
the levels of emissions reductions expected of certain forested
countries. Detailed rules for the implementation of the CDM were
adopted by decision and led to the operationalization of the CDM and
the authorization of the CDM Executive Board to take authoritative
decisions that determine which methods and projects will generate
offsets.
Thus, past practice under the UNFCCC and the KP sets a
precedent for COP and CMP decisions to interpret and advance
significantly the implementation of existing commitments but not to
create new, legally binding commitments. One possible next step in
the negotiations would be for the UNFCCC COP to reach the
consensus it failed to reach in Copenhagen and adopt the Accord, or
much of its content, as a decision. While this would not convert its
content into a legally binding form, it would allow the parties to
―operationalize‖ those aspects of the Accord that are within the
COP’s authority, such as the establishment of a new financial
mechanism.
B. Content
The BAP and the Accord differentiate between the outcomes
expected for developed countries and those expected for developing
countries that will be parties to a post-Copenhagen agreement. The
BAP does make clear, however, that developed countries are
expected to emerge with ―[m]easurable, reportable and verifiable
nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives
[QELRCs] . . . while ensuring the comparability of efforts among
them, taking into account differences in their national
circumstances.‖58 The Accord provides more precision by indicating
that developed (more specifically Annex I) countries will ―commit to
57. Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1, 24–26 (2002).
58. Bali Action Plan, supra note 8, para. 1(b)(i).
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implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-wide
emissions targets for 2020,‖59 and these have since been included in
the Accord’s Appendix I. A full analysis of these submissions is
beyond the scope of this Article, but even a superficial review can
identify a wide range of differences. While there is consistency
across submissions with regard to their specificity, the target pledged
by the European Union represents a twenty percent cut of emissions
from 1990 levels by 2020 and is enshrined in binding legislation. The
target pledged by the United States represents a seventeen percent cut
of emissions from 2005 levels and is based on draft legislation whose
prospects for passing diminish daily.
In the Bali Action Plan, developing country parties will, by
contrast, emerge with ―[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions
[NAMAs] . . . in the context of sustainable development, supported
and enabled by technology, financing, and capacity-building in a
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner.‖60 The Accord
develops this further by providing that developing (more specifically
non-Annex I) countries will:
implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted
to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in
Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF
document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in
the context of sustainable development. Least developed
countries and small island developing States may undertake
actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.61
The choice of the words ―commitment‖ in the BAP and ―commit
to implement . . . targets‖ in the Accord to describe the participation
of developed countries, as contrasted with ―will implement . . .
actions‖ in the Accord to describe the participation of developing
countries, is deliberate. This, as well as the Accord’s distinct
appendices, perpetuates what a number of developing country
delegations have characterized as an essential ―firewall‖ or
―development divide‖ between rich and poor countries. Arguably, the
use of different terms could draw a line, in the future, between legally
binding obligations of result for developed countries and softer
obligations of conduct—or even nonbinding ―pledges‖—by
59. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
60. Bali Action Plan, supra note 8, para. 1(b)(ii).
61. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 5.
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developing countries. The references to Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC
and the special circumstance of least developed countries and small
island developing states, as well as the remarks included with many
developing country submissions to Appendix II of the Accord,
suggest that performance of at least some of the actions listed will
remain contingent on whether financial resources are available to
support those actions.
If the Accord remains a high water mark for what the negotiations
are able to achieve, then both developed and developing country
commitments will simply remain soft law of a different texture.
Which countries will be considered ―developed‖ and which
―developing‖ is undetermined by the BAP, while the Accord reverts
back to the Annex I/non-Annex I division in place since 1992.
Again, an analysis of Appendix II pledges is beyond the scope of
this Article, but they appear in great variety and have proved difficult
to analyze and compare with regard to their ambition and likely
impact.62
C. Institutions and Procedures
The concept of measuring, reporting, and verifying (MRV) both
developing country actions and developed country financing of such
actions also carries with it a strong institutional and procedural
expectation, raising the question of by whom and how QELRCs,
financial commitments, NAMAs, targets, and pledges will be
measured, reviewed, and verified. The BAP does not contain any
further reference to monitoring, review, or compliance procedures.
The Accord seeks to move this issue a notch further by providing that
developed country targets, as well as their financial pledges, ―will be
measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any
further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will
ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust
and transparent.‖63
Scrutiny of developing country actions will also be tightened under
the Accord. Developing country NAMAs that do not receive financial
support under the Accord will be domestic MRV systems, and the
62. See TARYN FRANSEN, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, SUMMARY OF GHG
REDUCTION PLEDGES PUT FORWARD BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009),
http://pdf.wri.org/summary_of_non_annex1_pledges_2009-12.pdf.
63. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 2, para. 4.
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results of this review will be reported to the UN and subjected to
―international consultations and analysis under clearly defined
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.‖64
NAMAs that do receive support ―will be subject to international
measurement, reporting, and verification in accordance with
guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.‖65
These institutions and procedures for MRV represent significant
advances over existing systems under the UNFCCC, particularly for
developing countries. They fall well short of the compliance
procedures as applied to Annex I countries under the Kyoto Protocol.
It should be noted, however, that these Accord provisions appear to
require additional actions by the COP and are not, therefore
―operational immediately.‖66
VII. UNILATERAL STANDARD SETTING FOR LEGAL CHARACTER: A
CASE STUDY OF DRAFT U.S. CLIMATE LEGISLATION
The pressure on developing countries, particularly major
economies, to strengthen and fulfill the pledges they have made as
part of the Copenhagen Accord in a way that is comparable in their
legal character to developed country commitments is likely to grow.
Bilateral diplomacy will build this pressure further and may well be
backed by the threat of unilateral, domestic policies aimed at
addressing ―competitiveness concerns‖ between those countries that
are undertaking caps and those that are not. Both the U.S. and the
European Union have been actively considering the use of ―border
adjustment measures‖ as means of encouraging their major trading
partners to adopt climate policies that are comparable to theirs. Other
industrialized countries are taking a wait-and-see approach but may
be reasonably expected to follow the lead of the world’s largest
economies. One of the stated objectives of U.S. measures is to
prevent emissions ―leakage‖ that might occur through the relocation
of GHG-intensive supply chains and production processes from
capped to uncapped countries.
The stated purposes and specific measures contained in the
American Clean Energy and Security Act67 (ACES) passed by the
64. Id. para. 5.
65. Id.
66. Id. pmbl.
67. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
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U.S. House of Representatives (but not yet enacted into law) are an
extreme example of a set of legal implications that might arise from
the legal character of commitments that a country signs up to at a
post-Copenhagen conference. Similar types of measures have been
contemplated in more recent draft legislation and proposals emerging
from the Senate.68
ACES would, if it became law, set negotiating goals for the U.S.
delegation that would include: ―induc[ing] foreign countries, and, in
particular, fast-growing developing countries, to take substantial
action with respect to their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with
the Bali Action Plan developed under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.‖69 Furthermore, the bill provides that
―[i]t is the policy of the U.S. to work proactively under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and in other
appropriate fora, to establish binding agreements, including sectoral
agreements, committing all major greenhouse gas-emitting nations to
contribute equitably to the reduction of global greenhouse gas
emissions.‖70
More specifically, under the bill, the U.S. Administration would be
directed to achieve the following negotiating objectives:
(1) to reach an internationally binding agreement in which all
major greenhouse gas-emitting countries contribute equitably
to the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions; (2) (A) to
include in such international agreement provisions that
recognize and address the competitive imbalances that lead to
carbon leakage and may be created between parties and nonparties to the agreement in domestic and export markets; and
(B) not to prevent parties to such agreement from addressing
the competitive imbalances that lead to carbon leakage and
may be created by the agreement among parties to the
agreement in domestic and export markets; and (3) to include
in such international agreement agreed remedies for any party
to the agreement that fails to meet its greenhouse gas reduction

68. E.g., Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S.1733, 111th Cong.
(2009); Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S.2877,
111th Cong. (2009).
69. H.R. 2454 § 401.
70. Id.
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obligations in the agreement.71
Thus, the U.S. would be seeking, in an international agreement,
comparable efforts from major economies and remedies to enforce
them. If these negotiating objectives were not met by January 2018,
ACES would trigger the establishment of a ―border adjustment‖
program that could penalize importers of products made by U.S.
competitors in energy or GHG-intensive, trade-exposed sectors, when
those products are produced or manufactured in a country that failed
to meet at least one of several tests. While the detailed methodologies
of how border measures would be applied to specific products,
sectors, and countries have not been developed in the bill, these tests
give an indication of what the U.S. will be looking for in terms of
―comparability‖ of efforts of its major trading partners:
(1) The country is a party to an international agreement to
which the United States is a party that includes a nationally
enforceable and economy wide greenhouse gas emissions
reduction commitment for that country that is at least as
stringent as that of the United States. (2) The country is a party
to a multilateral or bilateral emission reduction agreement for
that sector to the [sic] which the United States is a party. (3)
The country has an annual energy or greenhouse gas
intensity . . . for the sector that is equal to or less than the
energy or greenhouse gas intensity for such industrial sector in
the United States in the most recent calendar year for which
data are available.72
It is worth noting that ACES also contains provisions that would
limit the eligibility of countries to receive U.S. financial assistance
generated by the bill. Eligibility would be reserved for those
developing countries that entered into an international agreement to
which the United States is a party, ―under which such country agrees
to take actions to produce measurable, reportable, and verifiable
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation‖ or has ―in force national
policies and measures that are capable of producing measurable,
reportable, and verifiable greenhouse gas emissions mitigation‖; and
―has developed a nationally appropriate mitigation strategy that seeks
to achieve substantial reductions, sequestration, or avoidance of
71. Id.
72. Id.
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greenhouse gas emissions, relative to business-as-usual levels.‖73
Finally, ACES sets standards for which countries that have
established emissions trading schemes will be allowed to sell
allowances into the United States cap and trade program. These
standards are based on a United States government assessment of
whether that country’s scheme is ―at least as stringent as the program
established by this title, including provisions to ensure at least
comparable monitoring, compliance, enforcement, quality of offsets,
and restrictions on the use of offsets.‖74
From this analysis it can be concluded that if a major developing
economy undertakes commitments that are more comparable in form,
content, and process to commitments undertaken by developed
countries, it will less likely be subject to these kinds of unilateral
measures from the United States. It also suggests that the institutions
and procedures that may be making important determinations about a
country’s compliance with its domestic climate policy or its
international commitments may include regulatory agencies in other
countries.
Finally, it is important to note that a number of these unilateral
measures would have an impact on the flow of products, services,
and capital between countries and as such could trigger the
application of multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade and
investment agreements. In some instances, this could include their
dispute-settlement mechanisms. This could lead to a situation in
which, for example, a WTO dispute-settlement panel is called on to
assess whether restricting trade in products based on the
comparability of climate legislation between two trading partners is a
justifiable trade measure.75
VIII. CONCLUSIONS: THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF LEGAL CHARACTER
Lessons from other treaties tell us that international agreements
with binding, specific commitments backed by robust review
procedures are generally more effective. In general, signing on to
73. Id.
74. Id. § 311.
75. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION & UN ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME,
TRADE
AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2009),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf; GARY C.
HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009).
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these kinds of commitments demonstrates strong political will,
encourages other countries to do the same, and thus should lead to
better environmental results. In most cases, the international penalties
associated with failing to comply with an international treaty are
unspecified, and thus the risks of being found in noncompliance seem
low.
Box 2 summarizes the risks and benefits that would be associated
with a climate agreement that is either legally binding or nonbinding
in its form; that contains high or low quality content, in terms of legal
form, clarity, specificity, and ambition of obligations; and that
contains more or less robust requirements for reporting and verifying
compliance and enforcement.
It is important to note that a treaty with a high standard of legal
character has the potential to exclude the participation of some
countries. The additional hurdles required by domestic ratification
processes can act to exclude even some governments that would
otherwise wish to join the regime. Others may simply feel unready to
commit to its terms. In circumstances where this would lead to the
exclusion of countries crucial to the treaty’s success, the different
aspects of legal character need to be weighed carefully and,
potentially, traded off against other aspects of an agreement.
There are indications that a post-2012 climate change regime will
support performance-based financial mechanisms and carbon markets
that could reward countries that are willing to make specific
undertakings. Our case study of draft U.S. legislation suggests that
countries undertaking legally binding commitments may have
preferential access to large-scale carbon markets and may be able to
avoid the unilateral trade sanctions contemplated by the United States
and others.
There will be intense pressure on developing country major
economies in general, and the higher emitters among them in
particular, to take on commitments that are more closely comparable
in their legal character to the commitments of industrialized
countries. Industrialized countries will continue to push hard through
the MEF and through the G-20 to secure commitments from major
economies that are non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC and the KP
that move them towards standards of form, content, and procedural
and institutional oversight that are comparable to their own.
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The contributions of a developing country major economy to the
negotiations will be in part based on what it can afford to undertake
politically and economically vis-a-vis its economic competitors and
where it wishes to position itself geopolitically in the coming decades
in relation to its peers on either side of the ―development divide.‖
Given this wide diversity of views, the prospect of agreeing to a
new, legally binding instrument that is widely perceived as balanced
in terms of its form, content, and procedural and institutional
treatment of commitments appears remote—particularly in the
context where the adoption of such an instrument will require a
consensus of all parties. There are at least two possible ways forward
signaled by the Copenhagen Accord. The first is that countries that
have long championed the need for a legally binding international
instrument explicitly or implicitly abandon this goal and begin to
pursue methods of ―internationalizing‖ the pledge and review of
national policies through soft law approaches outside the UNFCCC
process. This could have long-term consequences for the
international community’s perception of the necessity and the utility
of international law as a response to global environmental challenges.
Alternatively, the UNFCCC parties could choose to reinvest in
strengthening those aspects of the legal character of the climate
change regime that are already within the UNFCCC’s mandate as a
legally binding treaty. While the COP cannot, by decision alone,
adopt new targets and actions that are binding on its parties, it has
provided (and can continue to provide) a forum for its parties to
report on their efforts to reduce emissions, such as those now
contained in the Accord’s appendices. More importantly, it can
strengthen and expand the operation of the institutions and
procedures designed to ensure quality of data, harmonize standards
and policies, coordinate carbon markets, and review parties’
performance. The insistence that there can be no progress without a
new legally binding instrument, if it blocks movement forward within
the UNFCCC, could, ironically, permanently undermine the
credibility of the Convention—which remains the only legally
binding instrument of near universal membership.

